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Journalists  played  an  important  role  in  the  Vietnam  War  through  their  critique  and  
analysis  of  how  the  war  progressed.  Their  writing  in  newspapers  and  magazines  
influenced  public  and  government  opinion  about  the  war.  Journalists  did  not  just  
write  newspaper  or  magazine  articles,  or  record  interviews  for  television,  they  wrote  
books  about  their  experiences,  interviews  and  research.  These  books,  long-form  
journalism,  explored  many  aspects  of  the  Vietnam  War,  analytically  and  critically.  The  
Vietnam  War  influenced  the  rise  of  this  type  of  journalism  through  the  detail  and  
context  that  journalists  were  able  to  provide  about  a  war  that  lasted  nineteen  years  
and  would  see  America  unable  to  prevent  the  fall  of  South  Vietnam  to  communism.  
The  historiography  of  the  media  and  the  Vietnam  War  overwhelmingly  focuses  on  
information  and  analysis  that  appeared  in  newspapers,  magazines  and  on  television.  
There  is  a  distinct  lack  of  analysis  on  long-form  works  as  a  medium  in  the  Vietnam  
War.  This  research  shows  that  the  Vietnam  War  created  a  situation  whereby  
traditional  mediums  were  insufficient  to  fully  explain  the  Vietnam  War.  The  war  
necessitated  journalistic  investigation  and  criticism.  This  led  to  the  writing  of  many  
popular  and  successful  long-form  works  that  presented,  examined  and  criticised  the  
Vietnam  War.  Journalists  examined  in  long-form  the  secrecy  inherent  in  the  war  such  
as  the  control  of  information  and  perception  of  how  the  war  progressed.  They  also  
examined  in  detail  the  failure  of  policy  and  military  strategy  in  South  Vietnam  which  
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Journalists  as  the  Fourth  Estate  have  for  a  long  time  been  observers  and  speakers  
for  society,  playing  a  crucial  role  in  the  dissemination  of  information  that  might  not  
have  been  easily  accessible  in  the  public  domain.  In  this  role  journalists  can  increase  
public  awareness  and  understanding  of  the  news  that  they  report.  The  Vietnam  War  
challenged  the  normal  role  of  journalists  as  traditional  short-form  reporting  was  
insufficient  for  an  expansive  understanding  of  the  Vietnam  War.  Because  of  this  an  
alternate  method  of  explanation  was  needed.  Long-form  journalism  was  one  of  the  
main  mechanisms  which  journalists  used  to  address  the  Vietnam  War.  Long-form  -  
new  journalism,  literary  nonfiction  -  is  an  expansion  upon  traditional  journalistic  
practices  of  research  and  analysis  of  current  events  found  in  short-form  work  but  
with  more  emphasis  on  author  opinion  and  analysis.  The  purpose  of  long-form  
journalism  is  to  present  and  explain  in  detail  a  news  story.   
 
 
The  Vietnam  War  influenced  the  rise  of  long-form  journalism  due  to  the  need  of  the  
journalists  to  not  only  present  the  facts  of  what  occurred  in  Vietnam  but  to  try  to  
explain  them  in  the  wider  context  of  the  war.  The  American  ambassador  to  Vietnam  
asked  Newsweek  correspondent  Francois  Sully  “why,  Monsieur  Sully,  do  you  always  
see  the  hole  in  the  doughnut?”1  Sully  replied,  “because,  Monsieur  l’Ambassadeur,  …  
there  is  a  hole  in  the  doughnut.”2  Long-form  journalism  sought  to  explain  the  hole  in  
the  doughnut,  rather  than  just  identify  it.  This  long-form  writing  was  influenced  by  
two  main  factors  of  the  Vietnam  War  that  journalists  chose  to  examine.  These  were  
the  secrecy  of  the  war  and  the  failure  of  American  policy  and  strategy.  Journalists  
examined  secrecy  in  Vietnam  by  investigating  the  manipulation  of  facts  to  cover  up  
military  and  political  failure  and  the  inflation  of  the  numbers  of  enemies  killed,  as  
well  as  to  present  the  untold  experiences  of  Vietnam  veterans.  American  policy  in  
Vietnam  was  studied  in  detail  by  journalists  who  looked  at  the  origin  of  Vietnam  
                                                          
1  William Prochnau,  Once  Upon  A  distant  War:  David  Halberstam,  Neil  Sheehan,  Peter  Arnett  –  Young  
War  Correspondents  and  Their  Early  Vietnam  Battles.  New  York,  Vintage  Books,  1995 p.  50. 
2  Prochnau,  Once  Upon  A  distant  War, p.  50. 
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policies,  the  progression  of  troop  deployment,  the  accompanying  strategy  that  it  
maintained  and  rewarded  and  the  failure  of  the  strategic  hamlet  program  as  a  
symptom  of  the  manipulation  of  fact  by  the  American  and  Vietnamese  governments. 
 
Vietnam  presented  a  new  challenge  for  correspondents  in  covering  the  war  as  the  
view  of  the  war  of  many  correspondents  differed  to  that  of  much  of  the  American  
leadership.  Those  criticised  would  tell  the  journalists  to  “Get  on  the  team.”3  However,  
to  fully  deconstruct,  analyse  and  then  synthesise  what  lay  behind  the  different  sets  
of  information  required  a  different  method  than  the  newspapers  and  magazines  of  
the  day  provided  through  short-form  articles.  A  front  page  in  a  newspaper  or  a  half  
dozen  pages  in  a  magazine  was  not  sufficient  to  explain  the  Vietnam  War  to  readers  
in  depth.  What  journalists  required  to  examine  in  detail  and  depth  the  Vietnam  War  
was  a  medium  which  allowed  them  to  present  their  exhaustive  wealth  of  information  
on  a  war  that  they  had  been  a  part  of  and  seen  develop,  providing  extensive  
evidence  through  researched  sources  and  experiences.  It  required  long-form  
journalism,  the  written  presentation  of  journalistic  research  as  a  published  book.  This  
is  the  primary  source  material  analysed  to  investigate  how  the  Vietnam  War  
influenced  the  rise  of  long-form  journalism.  By  examining  the  Vietnam  War  in  the  
comprehensive  manner  allowed  by  long-form  journalism,  journalists  presented  in  
detail  key  aspects  of  the  wars. 
 
Many  war  correspondents  wrote  long-form  journalism  about  the  Vietnam  War:  Neil  
Sheehan,  Michael  Herr,  Frances  Fitzgerald,  Wallace  Terry,  David  Lamb,  David  
Halberstam,  Joseph  Galloway  and  Hugh  Lunn.    The  works  by  David  Halberstam,  Neil  
Sheehan,  Wallace  Terry  and  Michael  Herr  are  however  most  appropriate  in  examining  
long-form  journalism’s  rise  due  to  their  scope  of  coverage  and  popularity.  Long-form  
journalism  has  multiple  definitions  regarding  a  broad  spectrum  of  work,  however  a  
general  definition  of  long-form  is  given  in  order  to  assess  what  is  and  is  not  long-
form,  and  how  similar  works  with  different  content  fit  into  the  same  category.  The  
importance  of  long-form  journalism  is  that  for  journalists  seeking  to  give  explanations  
                                                          
3  David  Halberstam,  The  Best  and  the  Brightest.  New  York,  Random  House,  1972,  p.  205. 
7 
 
of  the  Vietnam  War  it  gives  greater  freedom,  both  in  depth,  limited  stylistic  design  
and  publishing  constrictions.  Because  of  this,  journalists  are  freed  to  fully  explore  
their  area  of  research.  The  authors  themselves  are  examined  to  provide  background  
details  of  their  lives  and  influences  and  to  give  a  general  representation  of  the  work  
that  they  have  created.  Journalists  explored  the  differing  of  opinions  and  
interpretations  of  the  journalists  and  the  American  government  surrounding  these  
elements  of  the  Vietnam  War  which  had  continued  for  over  a  decade.  By  examining  
the  war  through  long-form,  journalists  can  address  in  detail  the  issues  of  the  war  in  
























A  Definition  of  Long-form  Journalism 
 
Journalistic  books  have  a  varied  and  broad  definition  from  literary  nonfiction,  
nonfiction  reportage,  and  new  journalism  to  long-form  to  book-length  journalism.4  It  
is  important  to  define  long-form  journalism  to  avoid  confusion  and  to  separate  out  
the  work  that  is  being  studied  from  other  forms  of  journalism.  Long-form  journalism  
shall  be  defined  as:   
 
“Where  practitioners  use  journalistic  methods  to  research  and  write  
independently  about  contemporary  people,  events  and  issues  at  book  length  in  
a  timely  manner  for  a  broad  audience  they  are  engaged  in  book-length  
journalism.”  5 
 -  Mathew  Ricketson.   
 
While  this  is  a  very  general  definition  of  a  debated  medium,  it  explores  common  
features  in  long-form  journalistic  writing  such  as  extensive  and  broad  research,  the  
constraints  of  time  as  well  as  a  necessary  broad  appeal.6  These  factors  are  important  
because  they  all  speak  to  the  common  qualities  of  very  different  bodies  of  work.  
They  thus  accept  a  broad  range  of  work  as  long-form  journalism  while  retaining  
elements  necessary  to  still  be  defined  as  journalism.  In  contrast,  short-form  
journalism  encompasses  traditional  reporting  in  newspapers  and  magazines,  focusing  
on  presenting  facts  with  minimum  commentary  and  analysis  and  with  a  focus  on  the  
immediate.   
 
                                                          
4 Heather  Gilbert.  “Books  as  Journalism,”  in  Encyclopedia  of  Journalism:  A  –  C,  ed.  Christopher  H.  
Sterling,  173  –  176.  Los  Angeles,  Sage  Publications  Inc.,  2009,  p.  173.  
5  Mathew  Ricketson,  “The  New  Appreciation  of  Long-Form  Journalism  in  a  Short-Form  World,”  in  
Australian  Journalism  Today,  ed.  Mathew  Ricketson,  217  –  233.  South  Yarra,  Palgrave  Macmillan,  2012,   
p.  219. 
6 Gilbert.  “Books  as  Journalism,”  p.  173;  The  Encyclopedia  also  addresses  common  elements  of  long-
form  such  as  research  and  the  purpose  of  long-form  books  as  tools  of  news  presentation.  It  also  
presents  arguments  about  who  can  or  cannot  write  long-form  and  whether  or  not  the  work  must  be  
fiction  or  nonfiction,  as  well  as  presenting  the  difficulty  of  assigning  the  long-form  its  own  genre  due  
to  the  diversity  of  those  writing  and  their  style.  Because  of  this  a  broad  definition  has  been  used.     
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Chapter 1: Why  Long-form  Journalism  is  important. 
 
Long-form  journalism  played  an  important  role  in  journalistic  examination  and  critique  
of  the  Vietnam  War.  The  historiography  surrounding  the  role  of  the  media  within  the  
Vietnam  War  is  broad  with  authors  such  as  Phillip  Knightly  and  Daniel  Hallin  covering  
the  role  and  influence  of  the  media  in  the  war.7  Their  works  focus  predominantly  on  
short-form  coverage  of  the  war  and  the  role  of  journalists  in  this  regard.  They  do  
not  explore  the  long-form  works  of  Vietnam  correspondents,  focusing  on  the  
influence  of  short-form  writing  and  television  broadcasts  over  the  course  of  the  war.8  
The  exclusion  of  long-form  overlooks  an  important  tool  of  journalistic  critique  that  
was  integral  to  the  investigation  of  the  Vietnam  War.   
 
Long-form  journalism  serves  to  broaden  the  scope  of  journalistic  inquiry.  It  lessens  
the  limitations  on  journalists  necessitated  by  the  media  that  their  work  appears  in.  
Unlike  short-form  journalism,  which  then  appeared  primarily  in  newspapers,  long-form  
journalism  allows  a  reporter  greater  freedom  in  how  they  wish  to  present  their  
opinions  and  arguments.  By  presenting  information  in  this  manner  journalists  are  able  
to  include  more  than  just  facts  and  statistics.  They  are  able  to  present  their  own  
opinions,  analysis  and  conclusions  across  a  wider  span  of  time,  be  it  months  or  many  
years,  and  go  into  much  greater  depth.  This  is  critical  when  analysing  a  war  as  long  
as  Vietnam  as  to  convey  the  missteps  and  their  consequences,  explanation  and  deep  
analysis  require  length.  In  particular  the  opinions  of  journalists,  often  missing  from  
the  pages  of  newspapers  or  magazines  is  captured,  presented  and  expanded  upon  in  
long-form  journalism.  By  presenting  their  opinions,  journalists  are  able  to  convey  
unique  perspectives  of  the  war,  based  on  not  just  their  research  of  the  events  but  
also  their  own  experiences.     
 
Long-form  journalism  and  the  process  of  writing  a  book  thus  allows  for  greater  
forethought  and  consideration  of  one’s  writing.  The  benefits  of  length  in  long-form  
                                                          
7 Daniel  Hallin,  The  Uncensored  War:  The  Media  and  Vietnam.  Los  Angeles,  University  of  California  
Press.,  1989, P.  213. 
8 Hallin,  The  Uncensored  War,  pp.  211-213. 
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journalism  allow  authors  more  freedom  to  explore  their  topic  than  a  copy  editor  at  
the  desk  of  a  daily  publication  would  allow.  War  correspondents  like  Neil  Sheehan  
are  able  to  produce  books  of  over  800  pages  describing,  analysing,  questioning  and  
concluding  on  events  that  they  experienced  in  the  Vietnam  War.  For  Sheehan  as  a  
wire  service  reporter,  constantly  constrained  by  a  deadline  and  the  rush  to  be  first  in  
getting  a  story  from  Vietnam  onto  a  press  in  America,  long-form  allows  for  a  much  
broader  and  more  in-depth  look  at  his  experiences.  In  short-form  it  is  simply  not  
possible  for  authors  to  go  into  this  level  of  detail. 
 
Long-form  journalism  frees  an  author  stylistically.  In  long-form  an  author  is  able  to  
write  and  convey  information  in  a  manner  that  might  be  unacceptable  in  a  
conventional  short-form  setting  that  requires  adherence  to  a  simplistic/specific  
informative  style.  Long-form  allows  writers  to  expand  and  develop  the  ideas  they  
investigate  and  present  more  information  and  opinion  about  their  topic.  David  
Halberstam’s  particular  style  of  writing  and  exposition  often  frustrated  the  editors  at  
the  New  York  Times.9  Similarly,  Dispatches  could  not  have  been  written  as  a  short-
form  because  his  unique  writing  style  does  more  to  present  his  opinion  and  
experiences  than  it  does  to  convey  the  standard  factual  information  required  for  a  
newspaper  article.  The  stylistic  choices  made  by  Michael  Herr  contrast  sharply  with  
standard  combat  reporting.  His  anecdotal,  fictionalising  and  figurative  addressing  of  
events  and  characters  are  developed  and  fleshed  out  thanks  to  the  freedom  provided  
by  the  long-form  medium.   
Lastly,  long-form  affords  journalists  more  independence.  When  publishing  articles  
under  the  banner  of  a  news  media  company,  certain  perspectives  may  not  be  
accepted.  The  publishing  of  a  book  independent  of  a  journalist’s  normal  news  
publisher  ensures  some  degree  of  insulation  from  censure,  both  of  facts  that  the  
author  presents  and  opinions  that  have  been  formed,  opinions  that  are  often  absent  
from  traditional  short-form  publication.10  By  publishing  independently  of  a  traditional  
news  media  company  journalists  are  able  to  challenge  greater  institutional  
                                                          
9  Prochnau,  Once  Upon  A  distant  War, p.  177. 
10 Prochnau,   pp.  83-84. 
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boundaries.  Journalists  publishing  work  as  long-form  ensures  they  are  not  beholden  
































Chapter 2: Journalism  During  the  Vietnam  War 
 
The  Vietnam  War  was  a  unique  war  for  the  United  States  of  America.  It  was  at  the  
time  the  longest  war  that  America  had  participated  in.  Their  involvement  having  
started  in  1950  while  the  French  were  still  fighting  the  First  Indochina  War  which  
ended  in  1954  with  French  defeat.  America  did  not  at  this  time  deploy  combat  
troops  to  Vietnam,  rather  they  provided  financial  and  material  aid  to  France’s  efforts  
against  the  Viet  Minh  who  were  fighting  for  impendence  from  French  rule.11  At  that  
time  the  issues  in  Vietnam  were  not  as  prevalent  as  those  occupying  America  in  the  
Korean  War.  This  was  where  the  action  was  and  the  sharp  spike  of  270  journalists  
entering  Korea  to  report  on  the  war  in  August  of  1950  forecast  what  would  take  
place  at  the  height  of  the  Vietnam  War.12    Korea  showed  that  despite  the  support  
correspondents  had  given  the  government  during  World  War  Two,  they  could  still  be  
critical  of  American  war  efforts.  This  was  demonstrated  by  news  reports  of  poorly  
armed  American  soldiers  retreating  in  the  face  of  Soviet  made  tanks  reaching  
America  and  the  military  leadership.13  This  criticism  came  from  a  desire  to  see  
America  win,  rather  than  criticism  of  the  necessity  of  the  war,  a  distinction  that  
would  be  important  for  journalists  covering  the  Vietnam  War  in  the  early  years.14   
The  Korean  War  was  over  quickly  enough  that  hard  questions  about  America’s  role  
and  actions  in  the  war  could  not  be  seriously  asked  of  the  government  by  
journalists.  The  Viet  Minh’s  success  against  the  French  in  1954  and  the  separation  of  
Vietnam  into  North  and  South  Vietnam  led  to  continued  American  support  for  the  
non-communist  regime,  due  to  the  American  desire  to  halt  the  spread  of  communism  
in  South  East  Asia.15  It  would  still  be  years  before  war  correspondents  arrived  in  
South  Vietnam  in  any  number  to  cover  the  American  involvement.  The  lack  of  
correspondents  did  not  mean  that  nothing  was  happening,  rather  that  the  American  
                                                          
11  George  C.  Herring,  America’s  Longest  War:  The  United  States  and  Vietnam  1950-1975.  New  York,  
Alfred  A.  Knopf,    1979,  p.  17. 
12  Phillip  Knightly.  The  First  Casualty:  From  the  Crimea  to  Vietnam:  The  War  Correspondent  as  Hero,  
Propagandist,  and  Myth  Maker.  The  United  States  of  American,  1975.  P.  338;  Herring,  p.  17. 
13  Knightly.  The  First  Casualty,  p.  337. 
14  Prochnau,  Once  Upon  A  distant  War, p.  142. 
15  Herring,  America’s  Longest  War,  p.  17. 
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government  under  Eisenhower  was  unwilling  to  make  a  great  commitment  to  
Vietnam.  This  commitment  would  not  be  expanded  upon  till  Kennedy’s  administration  
slowly  and  quietly  ramped  up  support.  While  American  soldiers  were  not  heavily  
deployed  in  front  line  positions  as  they  were  in  the  latter  years  of  the  war,  the  
military  advisors  were  more  involved  with  the  Army  of  the  Republic  of  Vietnam  
(ARVN)  combat  operations  than  the  government  let  on.16  This  demonstrated  an  early  
moment  of  misinformation  by  the  American  government  regarding  the  status  of  
American  support  of  the  Diem  regime.  For  the  reporters,  it  signified  the  development  
of  a  war. 
 
The  beginning  trickle  of  correspondents  began  around  1960  when  officers  in  the  
ARVN  attempted  to  depose  the  president  of  South  Vietnam,  Ngo  Dinh  Diem,  who  
was  installed/elected  by  the  United  States  after  the  French  withdrew  from  Vietnam.17  
The  coup  attempt  highlighted  Vietnam  internationally  and  thus  drew  a  small  group  of  
journalists  to  the  country  to  cover  the  issues  in  Vietnam.  These  early  reporters  would  
be  some  of  the  first  to  see  the  lay  of  the  land  in  Vietnam,  and  how  America  and  
the  Diem  government  of  South  Vietnam  were  failing  to  maintain  a  stable  country.  
Homer  Bigart  of  The  New  York  Times  (NYT),  a  war  correspondent  who  had  covered  
both  World  War  Two  and  the  Korean  War,  Malcolm  Browne  of  the  Associated  Press  
(AP),  Ray  Herndon  of  United  Press  International  (UPI)  and  Francois  Sully  of  Newsweek  
(who  had  lived  in  Vietnam  for  thirteen  years)  were  all  the  early  comers  to  the  
Vietnam  conflict.18  Bigart  would  not  stay  long  but  would  heavily  condemn  the  
Vietnam  government  and  America’s  involvement  before  leaving  Vietnam.19  Sully  too  
would  leave  but  not  voluntarily,  as  after  one  critical  piece  too  many  about  the  Ngo  
family’s  leadership  he  was  expelled  from  the  country  by  the  Diem  regime.20  These  
early  correspondents  would  not  last  till  the  war’s  end  in  1975  but  would  pave  the  
way  for  others  through  their  initial  perceptions  and  critique  of  Vietnam  but  also  the  
                                                          
16  Herring,  America’s  Longest  War,  p.  86. 
17  Jessica  Chapman,  Cauldrons  of  Resistance:  Ngo  Dinh  Diem,  The  United  States  and  1950s  Southern  
Vietnam.  London,  Cornell  University  Press,  2013.  p.  188. 
18  Knightly.  The  First  Casualty,  p.  374. 
19  Prochnau,  Once  Upon  A  distant  War, p.  45. 
20  Prochnau,  p.  126. 
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contacts  and  sources  they  cultivated  within  the  country  and  the  rules  that  they  
established  on  reporting  in  Vietnam.21  Bigart  would  attest  to  this  image  as  although  
he  did  not  spend  as  much  time  covering  Vietnam  as  those  correspondents  who  
would  follow  him,  he  quickly  identified  that  what  was  happening  in  Vietnam  under  
American  eyes  “doesn’t  work.”22  This  legacy  is  what  would  spur  further  questioning  
of  the  methods  and  eventually  the  validity  itself  of  the  war  by  future  correspondents  
whose  careers  would  be  made  by  their  coverage  of  the  war.  Like  the  American  
muckrakers  of  the  1900s  such  as  Lincoln  Steffens  who  “savagely  exposed  grafting  
politicians,  criminal  police,”23  in  the  cities  of  America,  journalists  in  Vietnam  would  
confront  the  dishonesty  and  failure  of  the  American  system  in  Vietnam  and  bring  













                                                          
21  Peter  Arnett,  Live  From  the  Battlefield:  From  Vietnam  to  Baghdad,  35  Years  in  the  World’s  War  
Zones.  New  York,  Simon  and  Schuster,  1994,  p.  75. 
22  Prochnau,  Once  Upon  A  distant  War, p.  54. 
23  Louis  Filler,  The  Muckrakers.  Pennsylvania,  The  Pennsylvania  State  University  Press,  1939,  p.  9. 
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Chapter 3: The  Long-form  Journalists 
 
Neil  Sheehan  entered  Vietnam  in  April  1962,  working  for  UPI.  The  twenty  six  year  
old  Sheehan  had  earned  a  scholarship  to  Harvard  where  he  a  was  journalist  for  one  
of  Harvard’s  student  publications.24  He  then  had  a  short  career  in  the  Army  as  a  
reporter  for  the  Army’s  Stars  and  Stripes,  would  work  initially  for  UPI  and  later  NYT,  
and  would  cover  the  Vietnam  War  for  over  10  years.25  As  a  journalist  Sheehan  
worked  as  a  stringer,  wiring  out  his  reporting  and  coverage  of  the  Vietnam  conflict  in  
daily  competition  with  other  publications,  primarily  Malcolm  Browne’s  AP.  Sheehan  
thrived  in  Vietnam  and  covered  many  of  the  events  of  the  war,  before  the  American  
public  even  became  wholly  aware  of  America’s  involvement  in  Vietnam.  This  included  
his  coverage  of  the  Battle  of  Ap  Bac,  where  the  ARVN  demonstrated  themselves  
incompetent  on  the  field  of  battle  and  America  sustained  some  of  its  first  loses  in  
combat  to  Viet  Cong  forces.26  Sheehan  would  go  on  to  cover  the  Buddhist  crisis  and  
the  fall  of  the  Diem  regime  in  1963.27  In  1965  Sheehan  would  leave  UPI  and  go  to  
work  for  NYT  and  would  continue  to  work  for  them  as  a  reporter  covering  the  
Pentagon,  the  White  House,  the  Vietnam  War  and  its  intensification.  In  1972  he  
began  work  on  his  book  A  Bright  Shining  Lie:  John  Paul  Vann  and  America  in  
Vietnam  which  would  be  published  and  receive  a  Pulitzer  prize  in  1989.28 
 
 
The  twenty  eight  year  old  Harvard  educated  David  Halberstam  arrived  in  Vietnam  on  
the  same  day  that  Francois  Sully  was  expelled  from  the  country  by  the  Diem  
government  1963.29  Halberstam  had  previously  been  the  editor  of  a  student  
publication  at  Harvard  and  then  reported  for  NYT  as  a  war  correspondent  on  the  
conflict  in  the  Congo.  In  Vietnam  Halberstam  was  not  a  stringer  like  Sheehan.  He  
remained  unconstrained  by  daily  deadlines  and  the  immediate  demands  from  his  
                                                          
24  Prochnau,  Once  Upon  A  distant  War, p.  96-97. 
25  Prochnau,  p.  90. 
26  Neil   Sheehan,  A  Bright  Shining  Lie:  John  Paul  Vann  and  America  in  Vietnam.  London, Jonathan  Cape  
Ltd.,  1989,  p.  263. 
27  Sheehan,  A  Bright  Shining  Lie,  p.  334; Sheehan,  A  Bright  Shining  Lie,  p.  359. 
28  ‘The Pulitzer Prizes,’http://www.pulitzer.org/winners/neil-sheehan, (accessed 11 July 2017).  
29  Prochnau,  Once  Upon  A  distant  War, p.  128. 
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company’s  foreign  desk.  Perhaps  more  than  anyone  else  Halberstam  took  up  the  
mantle  that  Bigart  had  left  behind.  Halberstam  reported  tirelessly  on  a  critical  bent,  
like  the  muckrakers  before  him,  and  the  American  government  attacked  him  for  it.  
They  challenged  his  patriotism  and  went  so  far  as  to  suggest  his  removal  from  
Vietnam.30  Halberstam  left  Vietnam  in  1964  and  returned  only  once  more  during  the  
war.  Halberstam’s  coverage  of  the  Buddhist  crisis  and  coup  d’état  against  Diem  were  
reported  on  the  front  pages  of  NYT.31  For  his  reporting  Halberstam  received  the  
Pulitzer  prize  for  international  reporting  in  1964  alongside  Malcolm  Browne.32  
Halberstam  continued  to  work  for  NYT  and  would  publish  in  1972  The  Best  and  the  
Brightest,  his  damning  critique  of  American  actions  and  policy  in  Vietnam.  It  received  
excellent  reviews  from  Victor  Navasky,    calling  the  book  Halberstam’s  “most  
impressive  and  important.”33 
 
Wallace  Terry  was  sent  to  Vietnam  in  by  Time  magazine  in  1967  to  report  on  the  
role  of  black  soldiers  in  the  Vietnam  War  and  would  be  part  of  the  cadre  of  
reporters  venturing  to  Vietnam  at  the  height  of  the  conflict.34  Before  being  sent  by  
Time  to  Vietnam  he  had  worked  at  The  Washington  Post  and  been  the  editor  of  the  
Brown  University  student  newspaper.  At  29  years  old  Terry  was  older  than  the  
majority  of  enlisted  men  and  draftees  that  he  would  report  on.  Before  Vietnam  Terry  
had  been  covering  the  civil  rights  movement  for  Time  and  this  focus  on  black  rights  
and  attitudes  would  carry  over  into  his  reporting.  Terry  would  spend  two  years  
(1967-1969)  in  Vietnam  covering  the  war.  After  the  war,  he  would  continue  to  
research  the  role  of  black  Americans  in  Vietnam,  conducting  extensive  interviews  for  
a  PBS  Frontline  show  on  Vietnam,  which  drew  on  his  well  received  book,  Bloods:  An  
                                                          
30  Prochnau,  Once  Upon  A  distant  War, p.  130. 
31David  Halberstam, ‘The  New  York  Times:  Coup  in  Saigon  Article  Preview.’  
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9802E6D9113CEF3BBC4E53DFB7678388679EDE&legacy=tru
e ,(accessed  12  July  2017). 
32  ‘The Pulitzer Prizes,  
http://www.pulitzer.org/winners/malcolm-w-browne-and-david-halberstam, (accessed 11 July 2017). 
33  Victor  Navasky, ‘The New York Times on the Web: Books,’  
http://www.nytimes.com/books/98/03/15/home/halberstam-best.html, (accessed 12 July 2017). 
34  Wallace  Terry,  Introduction to  Bloods:  An  Oral  History  of  the  Vietnam  War  by  Black  Veterans.  New  
York,  Random  House,  1984,  p.  xv. 
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Oral  History  of  the  Vietnam  War  by  Black  Veterans.35     
 
Michael  Herr  asked  to  go  to  Vietnam  in  1967  as  a  reporter  for  Esquire  magazine.36  
Herr  was  an  independent  contractor  for  Esquire  and  like  Halberstam,  was  not  under  
pressure  to  wire  out  daily  reports  and  had  a  lot  of  freedom  within  Vietnam.  Like  
Sheehan,  Halberstam  and  Terry,  Herr  had  university  education  at  Syracuse  University  
and  had  also  written  articles  in  his  high  school  magazine,  indicating  his  interest  in  
writing  and  journalism.  Upon  coming  to  Vietnam  he  focused  his  attention  on  the  
soldiers  and  the  peculiarities  of  their  lives,  and  his,  in  Vietnam.  He  sought  to  move  
away  from  the  normalities  of  reporting  in  Vietnam,  the  day  to  day  current  events.  
His  published  book  Dispatches  was  received  with  wide  acclaim,  being  called  by  John  












                                                          
35  Terry,  Bloods,  back  cover quotation. 
36  ‘NPR,’ 
http://www.npr.org/2016/06/28/483776202/remembering-michael-herr-whose-dispatches-brought-the-war-
in-vietnam-home, 2016, (accessed 12 July 2017). 
37  Michael  Herr,  Dispatches.  New  York,  Alfred  Knopf  Inc.,  1977, 
 cover  quotation; Cain, Sian. ‘The Guardian’ 
https://www.theguardian.com/books/2016/jun/24/michael-herr-author-of-dispatches-dies-aged-76, 2016, 
(accessed 11 July 2017).  
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Chapter  4:  Long-Form Journalism and  Secrecy  in  Vietnam War 
 
The  secrecy  of  the  Vietnam  War  was  a  contributing  factor  to  the  rise  of  long-form  
journalism  due  to  journalists’  exposure  of  the  depth  of  the  American  government’s  
concealment  and  manipulation  of  information.  Efforts  were  made  by  the  American  
government  in  order  to  limit  knowledge  of  actual  progress  of  American  involvement  
in  Vietnam  during  Kennedy’s  term  due  to  an  institutional  desire  to  present  the  image  
of  success.38  Journalists  writing  long-form  about  the  Vietnam  War  focus  on  a  few  key  
elements  of  secrecy.  Both  Halberstam  and  Sheehan  cover  the  failings  of  the  Diem  
government  and  the  battle  of  Ap  Bac  as  instances  of  American  deception.  A  recurring  
element  among  their  work  was  the  ever  suspicious  body  count  used  by  the  American  
and  South  Vietnamese  governments  which  both  Terry  and  Herr  address  at  the  height  
of  the  war.  The  failure  of  war  meant  that  further  celebration  of  the  service  of  
Vietnam  veterans  was  limited  by  the  government  and  public  acceptance  and  
knowledge  of  veteran  issues  was  limited.  The  secrecy  surrounding  the  initial  American  
involvement  was  a  major  contributing  factor  to  the  writing  of  long-form  accounts  of  
the  Vietnam  War  as  it  demonstrated  American  duplicity  in  obfuscating  the  facts  that  
journalists  would  report  on.  Stringers  like  Sheehan  shed  light  on  the  institutional  
dishonesty  of  the  American  mission  in  Vietnam  in  their  daily  and  weekly  wires  but  it  
is  through  the  process  of  long-form  journalism  that  the  secrecy  of  Vietnam  was  
explored  in  detail.   
 
 
Halberstam  investigated  the  covering  up  of  failure  in  the  Vietnam  War  by  examining  
American  responses  to  negative  criticism.  The  American  involvement  in  Vietnam  
during  Kennedy’s  term  was  through  political  support  for  Diem,  providing  weapons  and  
funding  for  the  ARVN  and  Diem’s  regime  and  the  limited  deployment  of  American  
troops  as  advisors  to  the  ARVN.  Despite  this  the  ARVN  repeatedly  failed  to  
successfully  engage  Viet  Cong  forces  and  the  Diem  government  failed  to  secure  the  
support  of  the  South  Vietnamese  people,  which  was  heavily  criticised  by  the  media.  
                                                          
38  Halberstam,  Best  and  the  Brightest,  p.  177. 
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Halberstam  addresses  the  attempts  to  conceal  negative  information  between  the  
military  and  political  side  of  Vietnam  through  examining  a  special  reporting  mission  
to  Vietnam,  ordered  by  President  John  F.  Kennedy.39  This  fact  finding  mission,  which  
operated  in  two  parts,  was  conducted  by  Major  General  Victor  Krulak  and  Joseph  
Mendenhall  of  the  Foreign  Service.40  The  mission  produced  such  radically  different  
reports  of  success  and  failure  of  the  war  respectively  that  Kennedy  asked  “You  two  
did  visit  the  same  country,  didn’t  you?”41  Halberstam  uses  this  to  show  how  
committed  parts  of  the  American  leadership,  particularly  the  military,  were  to  
preventing  knowledge  of  failure  leaking  out  of  Vietnam.  Halberstam  identifies  that  
punitive  measures  were  taken  against  those  who  gave  the  negative  information  to  
Mendenhall  and  that  the  military  doubled  down  on  presenting  a  positive  image  of  
the  war  and  the  importance  of  Diem.42  The  military  and  political  situation  in  Vietnam  
was  not  favourable  to  the  American  mission,  however  it  was  not  presented  this  way  
to  the  correspondents  in  Vietnam,  to  the  public  or  to  the  President  of  the  United  
States  of  America.   
Halberstam  showed  in  his  reporting  through  NYT  that  covering  the  American  mission  
meant  receiving  false  information  from  American  and  Vietnamese  officials  about  the  
conduct  and  progress  of  the  war.  Halberstam’s  criticism  of  the  war  was  disputed  in  a  
report  written  by  General  Richard  Stillwell  which  contradicted  everything  that  
Halberstam  addressed  in  his  reporting,  “indeed  ‘the  picture  is  precisely  the  opposite,’  
Stillwell  reported.”43  Halberstam  attributed  this  to  the  American  relationship  with  the  
Diem  government.  Halberstam  collates  the  fabricated  evidence  of  success  of  the  Diem  
and  American  government  in  his  long-form  writing  and  presents  it  as  the  American  
inability  to  recognise  that  they  had  begun  to  believe  their  own  lies,  as  he  notes  that  
Diem’s  “reporting  became  our  reporting,  his  statistics  our  statistics,  finally  his  lies  our  
lies.”44  Hablerstam  identified  that  this  led  to  the  belief  that  Diem  was  a  “miracle  
                                                          
39  Halberstam,  Best  and  the  Brightest,  p.  277. 
40  Halberstam,  p.  276. 
41  Halberstam,  p.  277. 
42  Halberstam,  p.  279-80. 
43  Halberstam,  p.  280. 
44  Halberstam,  p.  183. 
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man”  45  who  America  could  work  with  and  rely  on  to  halt  the  spread  of  communism.  
Halberstam  argues  that  in  the  wider  context  of  the  war  the  secrecy  maintained  by  
the  military  was  detrimental  to  the  war  effort  but  became  part  of  the  institution  that  
encouraged  loyalty  to  career  over  President,  integrity  or  subordinates  and  a  system  
of  “fuck  up  and  move  up.”46 
 
 
Sheehan  and  Halberstam  both  examined  how  the  depiction  of  the  Battle  of  Ap  Bac  
was  a  symptom  of  a  larger  issue  of  a  false  portrayal  of  military  success.  The  Battle  
of  Ap  Bac  occurred  on  the  2nd  of  January  1963,  and  was  a  battle  in  which  ARVN  
forces  superior  in  number  and  equipment  were  defeated  by  a  well-entrenched  and  
informed  Viet  Cong  force.47  The  battle  resulted  in  the  ARVN  forces  suffering  heavy  
casualties,  five  helicopters  lost  and  three  American  advisors  killed,  a  major  defeat  for  
the  ARVN  and  America.48  General  Paul  Harkins,  the  commander  of  all  American  
forces  in  Vietnam  (through  the  Military  Assistance  Command,  Vietnam  or  MACV),  told  
reporters  that  “we’ve  got  [the  Viet  Cong]  in  a  trap  and  we’re  going  to  spring  it  in  
half  an  hour.”49  The  battle  was  hailed  as  a  victory  for  the  ARVN  side  by  the  official  
American  cables  to  Washington  and  by  the  Saigon  regime.50  Through  their  exposure  
of  this  failure  Halberstam  and  Sheehan  not  only  present  the  truth  about  the  defeat  
but  demonstrate  the  impact  of  the  battle  in  the  wider  context  of  the  war  -  how  
despite  the  incompetence  and  clear  defeat  of  the  ARVN  a  narrative  of  positivity  and  
success  was  coming  out  of  the  American  embassy  and  MACV  leadership  after  Ap  Bac.  
By  addressing  the  situation  in  Long-form  Halberstam  and  Sheehan  demonstrate  the  
commitment  to  the  image  of  positivity  at  the  expense  of  acknowledging  the  issues  of  
incompetence  in  the  ARVN  and  the  Diem  government.   
In  addressing  this  Halberstam  and  Sheehan  are  able  to  show  how  the  flow  of  
information  out  of  Vietnam  was  corrupted.  The  chain  of  communication  for  the  
                                                          
45  Halberstam, Best  and  the  Brightest,  p.  93. 
46  Halberstam,  p.  281. 
47  Sheehan,  A  Bright  Shining  Lie,  p.  204.   
48  Sheehan,  p.  263. 
49  Sheehan,  pp.  275 – 276. 
50  Sheehan,  p.  276;  Sheehan,  p.  290. 
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military,  through  General  Harkins,  Major  General  Vicktor  Krulak  and  General  Max  
Taylor,  prevented  many  dissenting  opinions  on  the  conduct  of  the  war  from  getting  
out.  Journalists’  long-form  writing  allows  for  this  analysis  of  the  internal  processes  of  
the  American  institutions  involved  in  Vietnam.  Sheehan  explores  this  through  a  
briefing  prepared  by  Lieutenant  Colonel  John  Paul  Vann.  The  briefing  was  about  his  
service  in  Vietnam  in  1963  and  his  recommendations  for  the  war.  It  was  extremely  
critical  of  how  the  war  was  progressing  and  went  into  many  of  the  problems  that  
Vann  had  encountered.  It  was  in  stark  contrast  to  the  reports  coming  from  Harkins.51  
However,  just  before  Vann  was  to  present  his  briefing  to  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  
providing  contradictory  evidence  to  the  assertion  that  the  war  in  Vietnam  was  going  
well,  it  was  cancelled  on  orders  from  Taylor.52  In  examining  secrecy  in  their  long-
form  work  Halberstam  and  Sheehan  show  how  officers  like  Taylor  and  Harkins  
suppressed  information  and  criticism  to  maintain  the  perception  of  success  in  
Vietnam.  They  also  showed  how  secrecy  was  used  by  officers  to  prevent  valid  
criticism  impeding  or  staining  their  careers.  In  this  way  Halberstam  and  Sheehan  
provide  greater  context  to  the  role  and  impact  of  secrecy  in  the  Vietnam  War  and  
its  influence  on  the  progression  of  the  war,  documenting  the  complete  refusal  by  the  
military  leadership  to  accept  any  notion  that  the  Vietnam  War  was  not  progressing  
well,  as  well  as  the  continuing  influence  of  institutional  loyalty  to  career.   
 
As  the  war  progressed  another  major  element  of  secrecy  that  emerged  was  the  
growing  claims  of  kills  or  the  body  count.  This  was  the  way  that  the  success  and  
progress  of  the  war  was  measured.  Terry,  Herr  and  Halberstam  address  the  malleable  
nature  of  these  statistics  in  their  examination  of  the  Vietnam  War  and  show  how  the  
tracking  of  the  numbers  of  enemies  killed  only  further  misrepresented  how  successful  
the  war  actually  was.  With  the  deployment  of  more  American  combat  troops  under  
President  Lyndon  Johnson  in  1965,  the  public  started  to  become  aware  of  the  
American  involvement  in  a  country  that  many  had  never  heard  of  and  some  in  
government  had  been  unable  to  place  on  a  map.53  Thus  the  exploration  of  the  body  
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count  over  the  course  of  the  war  through  long-form  was  necessary  for  a  greater  
understanding.  Herr  tells  of  how  a  “special  forces  captain  was  telling  me  about  it.  ‘I  
went  out  and  killed  one  VC  and  liberated  a  prisoner.  Next  day  the  major  called  me  
in  and  told  me  that  I’d  killed  fourteen  VC  and  liberated  six  prisoners.  You  want  to  
see  the  medal?”54  Herr  demonstrates  that  the  falsified  success  in  this  instance  was  
rewarded  with  a  medal.  This  helps  to  reinforce  Halberstam’s  concept  of  promotion  
through  failure,  where  the  misrepresentation  of  fact  results  in  career  progression.  
This  is  similar  to  Terry’s  telling  of  Luther  Benton  III’s  experience  where  Benton  
expresses  that  “They  said  I  killed  47  of  them.  I  don’t  really  believe  it.  They  always  
exaggerated  the  body  count.  The  whole  thing  in  Vietnam  was  how  many  people  you  
kill.”55   
The  kill  ratio  measurement  was  ultimately  unsuccessful  in  presenting  an  image  of  
success,  as  Terry  shows  how  Arthur  Woodley  believed  that  “I  don’t  think  America  
lost.  I  think  they  gave  up.  They  surrendered.”56  The  manipulated  figures  of  enemies  
killed  were  used  to  demonstrate  the  success  of  attrition  against  the  Viet  Cong.  Herr  
identifies  how  this  dedication  to  false  numbers  led  to  a  war  whereby,  “you  got  to  a  
point  where  you  could  sit  there  in  the  evening  and  listen  to  the  man  say  that  
American  casualties  for  the  week  had  reached  a  six-week  low,  only  eighty  GI’s  had  
died  in  combat,  and  you’d  feel  like  you’d  just  gotten  a  bargain.”  57  Herr  criticised  the  
manipulation  of  the  body  counts  as  “A  story  …  men  hunting  men,  a  hideous  war  and  
all  kinds  of  victims.  But  there  was  also  a  Command  that  didn’t  feel  this,  that  rode  us  
into  fictional  kill  rations,  and  an  Administration  that  believed  the  Command,  a  cross-
fertilization  of  ignorance.”58  This  long-form  analysis  shows  that  the  exaggerated  claims  
of  kills  did  not  create  a  better  measure  for  success,  but  rather  demonstrated  a  
failure  to  properly  take  account  of  the  progress  of  the  war.  Halberstam  critically  
addressed  the  futility  of  body  count  when  he  said  “there  were  30,000  Viet  Cong  
when  I  arrived  …  There  were  30,000  killed  when  I  was  there  and  there  were  30,000  
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Viet  Cong  when  I  left.”59  This  demonstrated  the  extent  of  misreporting  of  the  
numbers  of  killed  and  thus  the  misreporting  of  the  war’s  success.  In  a  war  that  
lasted  as  long  as  the  Vietnam  War  with  so  many  people  killed,  the  manipulation  of  
statistics  to  present  the  idea  that  the  war  was  being  won,  was  an  integral  element  
of  criticism  in  long-form  writing  by  journalists.  When  addressing  the  amounts  of  
enemy  forces  killed  via  short-form  reporting,  journalists  were  helping  to  present  the  
image  of  success  and  desired  by  the  American  and  Vietnamese  governments.  In  
effect,  “they  also  legitimized  them.”60  By  exploring  the  issue  of  the  body  count  in  
more  detail,  journalists  were  able  to  demonstrate  its  fraudulence  and  the  negative  
impact  it  had  on  the  war.   
 
In  investigating  the  secrecy  of  the  Vietnam  War  Terry  looked  at  how  the  experiences  
of  Vietnam  veterans  were  not  part  of  the  public’s  wider  knowledge.  By  exploring  this  
through  long-form  Terry  is  able  to  not  just  present  the  stories  of  Vietnam  veterans  
but  also  explain  why  their  stories  went  largely  unreported.  At  the  peak  of  the  war  
536,000  American  soldiers  were  deployed  at  one  time  to  Vietnam,  a  war  that  cost  
over  50,000  American  lives.  61  All  these  soldiers  had  unique  stories  of  their  
experiences.  Soldiers’  untold  experiences  of  the  Vietnam  War  were  a  contributing  
factor  to  the  rise  of  long-form  journalism  due  to  journalists’  interest  in  how  “there  
were  no  flags  waving  or  drums  beating  upon  the  return  of  any  Vietnam  veterans.”62  
While  previous  wars,  such  as  World  War  Two,  also  produced  soldiers’  memoirs  and  
tales  of  heroism  and  sacrifice,  the  loss  of  the  Vietnam  War  meant  that  many  
veterans’  experiences  were  unknown  to  the  wider  public. 
 
In  exploring  secrecy  during  the  Vietnam  War  Terry  looks  at  the  untold  experiences  of  
Vietnam  by  examining  how  black  veterans  were  treated  upon  their  return  to  America  
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after  the  Vietnam  War.  Terry  notes  that  “these  stories  are  not  to  be  found  in  the  
expanding  body  of  Vietnam  literature.”63  Terry  seeks  to  tell  stories  that  would  
otherwise  be  ignored  and  show  why  they  were  ignored.  He  explores  the  different  
reactions  to  returning  veterans.  He  shows  how  many  faced  difficulty  reintegrating  into  
society,  not  just  because  of  their  experiences  in  war,  that  soldiers  who  fought  in  the  
World  Wars  or  Korea  might  have  had,  but  because  the  American  population  was  
specifically  against  Vietnam  veterans  because  of  their  role  in  the  war.  Terry  shows  
this  through  Joe  Biggers’  experience  where  “One  day  I  wore  my  uniform  over  to  
Howard  University  in  Washington  …  Howard  is  a  black  school  …  I  thought  I  would  
feel  at  home.  The  guys  poked  fun  at  me  calling  me  Uncle  Sam’s  flunky.  …  They  
would  see  the  purple  heart  and  ask  me  what  was  I  trying  to  prove.  The  women  
wouldn’t  talk  to  you  either.  …  I  felt  like  I  was  completely  out  of  it.”64  Terry  gives  
another  example  of  Robert  Mountain  who  lost  his  leg  in  Vietnam  and  whose  
experience  demonstrated  the  lack  of  public  awareness  about  the  war.  “When  I  got  
back  to  the  real  world,  it  seemed  nobody  cared  that  you’d  been  to  Vietnam.  As  a  
matter  of  fact,  everybody  would  be  wondering  where  have  you  been  for  so  long.”65  
Terry  shows  how  soldiers  in  the  Vietnam  war,  particularly  black  soldiers,  were  not  
accepted  back  into  civilian  society.  By  exploring  these  issues  of  the  Vietnam  War  
through  long-form  journalism  Terry  is  able  to  give  an  in-depth  picture  of  another  
impact  of  the  secrecy  and  misinformation,  the  impact  it  had  on  returning  Vietnam  
veterans.   
 
Terry  shows  the  reason  for  this  through  an  interview  with  Joseph  Anderson.  "Career  
officers  and  enlisted  men  like  me  did  not  go  back  to  a  hostile  environment  in  
America  …  The  others  were  rejected,  because  the  nation  experienced  a  defeat.”66  
Because  of  America’s  defeat  in  Vietnam  those  who  fought  in  the  war  were  looked  
down  upon.  “The  nation  heard  stories  of  atrocities,  of  drugs.  Everyone  who  was  in  
Vietnam  was  suspect.”67    Despite  that  generalisation  being  unfair  in  its  application  to  
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all  veterans  who  experienced  Vietnam,  it  was  enough  to  blemish  their  records.  By  
examining  the  secrecy  surrounding  the  experiences  of  Vietnam  veterans  through  long-
form  journalism  Terry  is  able  to  explain  how  in  the  wider  context  of  the  war  the  
Vietnam  veterans  were  not  always  accepted  by  society,  despite  the  honourable  























Chapter  5: Policy  and  Strategy  and Long-form Journalism 
The  American  policy  and  strategy  for  the  Vietnam  War  was  an  element  that  
influenced  the  rise  of  long-form  journalism  due  to  journalists  revealing  how  and  why  
these  policies  and  strategies  failed.  The  American  policy  in  Vietnam  was  developed  by  
multiple  American  and  South  Vietnamese  governments.  The  course  of  American  policy  
in  South  East  Asia  was  set  by  America’s  inability  to  prevent  the  fall  of  China  to  
communism  in  1949.  American  support  for  the  French  in  Vietnam  began  slowly  after  
this  set  back.  Under  Eisenhower,  the  South  Vietnamese  regime  under  Diem  was  given  
material  aid  and  limited  military  advisory  support.68  Under  Kennedy  this  support  was  
stepped  up  through  the  policy  of  troop  deployment.  At  the  time  of  Kennedy’s  death  
in  1964  there  were  just  over  16,000  American  troops  in  Vietnam.69  Under  President  
Lyndon  Johnson  these  numbers  would  increase  exponentially,  to  over  500,000  at  the  
height  of  the  Vietnam  War.  These  numbers  would  subside  once  Richard  Nixon  
became  president  in  1969.70  Accompanying  this  was  the  policy  of  attrition,  which  was  
carried  out  as  a  search  and  destroy  strategy.  Other  policies  like  the  Strategic  Hamlet  
Program  were  and  indicator  of  America’s  inability  to  institute  effective  social  reform  
in  Vietnam  with  Diem  in  power  and  demonstrated  the  system  by  which  the  failure  of  
other  policy  would  occur.  The  Vietnam  War  was  the  culmination  of  years  of  policy  
failure  and  strategic  mismanagement.  For  correspondents  covering  the  war  these  
failures  were  a  ball  of  information  to  be  unravelled  and  examined. 
 
In  addressing  Vietnam  policy  in  long-form  writing  Halberstam  focuses  on  how  the  
failure  of  American  policy  to  prevent  the  establishment  of  Communist  China  in  1949  
influenced  the  policy  of  the  Vietnam  War.71  Halberstam  notes  that  Kennedy  “did  not  
want  to  cut  off  aid  to  Vietnam  because  that  might  start  events  comparable  to  those  
preceding  the  fall  of  China,  and  that  was  the  last  thing  he  wanted.”72  In  his  
                                                          
68  Herring,  America’s  Longest  War,  p.  17. 
69  Halberstam,  Best  and  the  Brightest,  p.  299. 
70  Sheehan,  A  Bright  Shining  Lie,  pp.  729-731. 
71  Loren  Baritz,  Backfire:  A  History  of  How  American  Culture  Led  Us  into  Vietnam  and  Made  Us  Fight  
the  Way  We  Did.  New  York,  Ballantine  Books,  1985,  p.  57. 
72  Halberstam,  p.  104. 
27 
 
examination  of  the  Vietnam  War’s  policy  origins  Halberstam  blames  America’s  failure  
in  China  as  the  primary  reason  for  Kennedy’s  support  for  South  Vietnam.  Halberstam  
explains  that  America’s  failure  to  prevent  the  fall  of  China  to  communism  and  the  
rabid  anti-communist  attacks  of  the  McCarthy  era  contributed  heavily  to  future  
American  administrations’  decisions  in  South  East  Asia.73  Halberstam  states  that  
despite  the  failure  in  China,  “a  remarkable  hubris  permeated  this  entire  time.”74  
America’s  involvement  in  Vietnam  demonstrated  a  failure  to  learn  from  the  past  and  
the  hubristic  notion  that  inevitably,  they  would  win.  This  is  a  key  component  of  
Halberstam’s  long-form  analysis  of  the  Vietnam  War’s  policy  decisions.  In  examining  
the  decisions  made  a  decade  before  Kennedy’s  choice  to  support  the  Diem  regime,  
Halberstam  is  able  to  show  how  this  choice  was  influenced  by  past  events.   
 
Herr  also  addresses  the  war’s  origins,  highlighting  the  difficulty  in  saying  when  the  
war  began  for  America.  He  notes  that  “you  couldn’t  find  two  people  who  agreed  
when  it  began”  and  presents  examples  such  as  1954  after  the  French  left,  from  
World  War  Two  and  the  Japanese  occupation  to  the  military  advisors  deployment  in  
1961  or  the  post-Gulf  of  Tonkin  resolution  in  1965.75  Herr  presents  the  start  of  the  
Vietnam  War  as  indefinable,  with  each  moment  in  history  a  step  toward  the  war’s  
further  development.  However  for  all  these  moments  in  history,  catalogued  and  
referenced  by  those  who  had  come  before,  “something  wasn’t  answered,  it  wasn’t  
even  asked.”76  Herr  questions  why,  with  all  the  information  that  America  had  on  the  
past  of  Vietnam,  “not  a  single  life  was  saved  by  the  information.”77    Both  Halberstam  
and  Herr  address  at  length  the  origins  of  the  Vietnam  policy  and  its  importance  on  
the  American  mission  in  Vietnam.  They  do  it  uniquely;  Halberstam  addressing  the  
origins  empirically  through  researched  information,  while  Herr  is  cautious  and  
inconclusive,  leaving  the  reader  to  answer  rhetorical  questions  themselves.  Both  
works  are  unique  in  style,  yet  both  authors  approach  the  war’s  origins  and  examine  
the  impact  of  the  past  on  the  future.  By  examining  the  war  in  depth  through  long-
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form,  Halberstam  and  Herr  are  able  to  address  the  policy  origins  of  the  war  in  
greater  detail  over  an  extended  period  of  time  demonstrating  the  path  from  the  
Chinese  Civil  War  to  what  would  become  the  Vietnam  War.   
 
Journalists  examined  in  detail  the  development  of  Vietnam  policy  through  troop  
deployments  across  a  decade  of  conflict  in  long-form  writing.  The  deployment  of  
troops  to  South  Vietnam  was  an  indicator  of  American  support  for  the  war  and  of  
the  strategy  that  the  American  generals  would  support,  that  of  a  war  of  attrition.  For  
journalists,  it  was  important  to  demonstrate  how  America  had  gone  from  a  meagre  
deployment  of  soldiers  to  assist  ARVN  operations  to  full  scale  frontline  combat  within  
six  years.  Halberstam  shows  how  the  first  steps  towards  troop  deployment  were  
made  swiftly  by  Kennedy  in  1961.  Kennedy’s  sending  of  General  Maxwell  Taylor  to  
Vietnam  to  assess  the  situation  in  South  Vietnam  and  the  need  for  combat  troops  
was  the  first  step  on  a  slippery  slope  to  a  full  scale  deployment  of  American  
troops.78  Halberstam  indicates  that  the  recommendation  of  combat  troops  was  not  
expected  as  “the  recommendations  shocked  Kennedy  to  such  an  extent  that  Taylor’s  
report  was  closely  guarded  and  in  some  cases  called  back.”79  Halberstam  shows  that  
Kennedy  was  not  expecting  the  recommendation,  nor  did  he  particularly  want  to  go  
through  with  it.  He  also  highlights  the  other  issues  of  the  recommendation,  that  of  
Taylor’s  inept  comparison  of  Vietnam  to  Korea.80  In  exploring  this  early  development  
of  the  war  Halberstam  examines  in  greater  detail  the  development  of  the  troop  
deployment  policy.  He  highlights  the  failure  of  the  administration  to  properly  prepare  
for  the  increase  of  support  to  the  Diem  regime.  Halberstam  draws  attention  to  this  
as  it  is  demonstrative  of  the  failing  of  the  leadership  of  the  American  military  to  
foresee,  and  thus  adapt,  to  the  new  war  they  would  be  fighting.   
 
The  Vietnam  War  was  a  new  type  of  war,  fought  unconventionally.  It  was  a  guerrilla  
war  that  would  be  fought  as  a  war  of  attrition.  The  extensive  analysis  of  troop  
deployment  by  Sheehan  and  Halberstam  examines  how  and  why  hundreds  of  
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thousands  of  American  soldiers  were  not  enough  to  win  the  Vietnam  War.  General  
Taylor  initially  requested  the  deployment  of  eight  thousand  as  an  initial  force  to  
support  the  ARNV  in  their  combat  operations.  81  Halberstam  uses  this  to  demonstrate  
the  Kennedy  administration’s  lack  of  realisation  of  how  this  military  commitment  
could  grow.  This  is  seen  in  how  Halberstam  shows  that  Robert  McNamara,  the  
Secretary  of  Defence  noted  in  1962  that  “I  believe  we  can  safely  assume  the  
maximum  U.S.  Forces  required  on  the  ground  in  Southeast  Asia  will  not  exceed  six  
divisions,  or  about  205,000  men.”82  Many  in  government  did  not  believe  that  the  
numbers  would  grow  this  large,  but  Halberstam  identifies  that  there  were  also  
detractors  of  this  policy.    A  principal  opponent  was  George  Ball,  the  Undersecretary  
of  State  for  Economic  Affairs.  He  had  observed  the  French  during  their  war  with  the  
Viet  Minh  and  so  was  well  aware  of  the  historical  parallels  between  America  and  
France.83  He  recognised  that  “if  they  went  ahead  with  the  proposals,  the  
commitment  would  not  stay  small.  They  would  have  300,000  men  in  there  within  
five  years.”84  This  deployment  of  troops  was  symptomatic  of  the  American  military’s  
attrition  strategy  for  the  war.  Sheehan  addresses  the  reasons  for  the  deployment  of  
additional  men  to  Vietnam  extensively  through  long-form  writing.  The  American  
strategy  of  attrition  was  one  of  the  main  influences  for  the  deployment  of  additional  
American  fighting  troops  after  Kennedy’s  death.85  Sheehan  argues  that  the  strategy  of  
attrition  proved  inefficient  against  the  North  Vietnamese  enemy.  In  1967,  already  
with  450,000  men,  when  Westmoreland  requested  an  additional  200,000,  he  did  so  
with  the  caveat  that  even  then  “the  war  might  go  on  for  as  long  as  two  years.  If  
not  …  it  could  last  five  years  or  longer.”86  This  shows  that  even  with  over  half  a  
million  men  Westmoreland  was  still  unable  to  guarantee  a  military  victory.  These  
incremental  increases  in  the  length  of  the  war  were  at  this  point  par  for  the  course  
with  the  same  statements  having  been  made  previously  by  Harkins.87 
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Sheehan  addresses  the  issue  of  increased  troop  deployments  as  a  symptom  of  the  
American  policy  of  attrition,  which  began  during  Harkins’  time  in  command  of  the  
military  in  Vietnam.  By  1965  General  Krulak,  who  had  initially  supported  the  policy  
under  General  Harkins,  became  critical  of  it  and  wrote  a  paper  discussing  the  issues  
of  the  attrition  policy.  Krulak  criticised  the  policy  due  to  the  amount  of  lives  it  would  
cost  (over  170,000)  just  to  deplete  the  North  Vietnamese  forces  by  just  twenty  
percent.88  Sheehan’s  analysis  of  the  policy  of  attrition  shows  how  it  was  one  of  the  
most  influential  of  the  war  as  it  highlighted  the  dogged  persistence  of  those  in  
command  of  the  Vietnam  War.  In  the  end,  Johnson  did  not  approve  additional  men  
for  Westmoreland  on  the  basis  of  public  opinion.89  America  was  also  fighting  an  
enemy  in  Ho  Chi  Minh  who  had  expressed  the  view  that  “you  would  kill  10  of  my  
men  and  1  of  yours.  But  even  at  that  rate  you  would  be  unable  to  hold  on,  and  in  
the  end  I  would  carry  the  day.”90  This  highlights  the  foolishness  of  the  commitment  
to  the  strategy  of  attrition  that  journalists  explored  in  their  long-form  writing,  as  
America  was  clearly  fighting  an  enemy  willing  to  sacrifice  a  generation  of  their  
people  to  win  the  war.  Herr  also  points  to  the  results  of  the  war  of  attrition  through  
beliefs  of  the  Marine  Corps,  “that  one  marine  was  better  than  ten  slopes  saw  
Marine  squads  fed  against  known  NVA  platoons  …  and  on  and  on  …  that  belief  was  
undying,  but  the  grunt  was  not,  and  the  Corps  came  to  be  called  by  many  the  finest  
instrument  ever  devised  for  the  killing  of  young  Americans.”91  In  examining  these  
policies  in  their  books,  journalists  criticised  the  deployment  of  troops  as  an  
unsuccessful  and  costly  attempt  to  bleed  the  Viet  Cong  dry  through  attrition.  By  
addressing  the  main  policy  that  paved  the  way  to  American  failure  in  Vietnam,  
journalists  show  the  extent  to  which  American  commanders’  insight  into  the  war  was  
limited  by  their  own  volition.  In  exploring  the  policy  of  troop  deployment  to  Vietnam  
and  the  strategy  it  supported,  journalists  address  a  central  theme  of  the  Vietnam  
War:  the  official  opinion  that  the  war  could  be  won  by  grinding  the  Viet  Cong  and  
North  Vietnamese  down  in  a  war  of  attrition,  when  in  reality  as  Krulak  noted  “‘You  
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cannot  win  militarily,’  …  ‘You  have  to  win  totally,  or  you  are  not  winning  at  all.’”92 
 
 
Herr  and  Sheehan  both  examine  the  lack  of  a  mission  plan  other  than  that  of  search  
and  destroy  under  the  banner  of  the  war  of  attrition  to  demonstrate  the  
mismanagement  of  policy  during  the  war.  Herr  criticises  the  lack  of  alternate  
effective  strategies  to  that  of  search  and  destroy.  “We  never  announced  any  policy  
at  all,  apart  from  finding  and  destroying  the  enemy,  and  we  proceeded  in  the  most  
obvious  way.”93  Herr  uses  this  to  show  that  the  American  military  failed  to  adopt  
alternate  effective  measures  against  the  Viet  Cong.  Sheehan  notes  that  the  
pacification  program,  which  focused  American  efforts  on  gaining  the  support  of  
peasants  through  land,  social  and  governmental  reform  was  not  supported  by  
Westmoreland,  and  thus  was  largely  ignored  by  the  American  Command.  General  
Krulak  spearheaded  this  program,  believing  that  the  prize  of  the  war  was  the  
Vietnamese  people.94  “Without  the  sustenance  they  provided  through  the  local  
guerrillas  and  the  clandestine  Viet  Cong  government,  the  Communist  regulars  could  
not  exist.”95  The  focus  on  search  and  destroy  over  the  pacification  program  severely  
limited  the  American  capacity  for  success  and  represented  grievous  policy  
mismanagement.  The  focus  on  attrition  and  search  and  destroy  meant  that  for  
Krulak,  “The  big-unit  fighting  with  the  Main  Force  Viet  Cong  and  the  NVA  ‘could  
move  to  another  planet  today  and  we  would  still  not  have  won  the  war.’”96  By  
exploring  the  emphasis  on  a  single  military  policy  through  long-form,  Sheehan  and  
Herr  demonstrate  how  the  American  command  mismanaged  strategy  due  to  
Westmoreland’s  lack  of  imagination,  and  how  the  administration’s  trust  in  
Westmoreland  ensured  that  the  policy  continued  without  deviation.  As  Sheehan  notes  
“Men  of  limited  imagination  who  rise  as  high  as  Westmoreland  had  tend  to  play  
blindly  to  their  strength  …  Westmoreland’s  strength  was  military  action.97 
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Halberstam  and  Sheehan  both  investigated  the  Strategic  Hamlet  Program  in  their  
long-form  writing  as  a  policy  representation  of  the  issues  of  secrecy  and  
misinformation  that  existed  during  the  Vietnam  War.  Under  Diem  and  future  South  
Vietnamese  governments  millions  of  Vietnamese  peasants  were  relocated  into  purpose  
built  villages,  to  protect  them  from  Viet  Cong  aggression  and  ensure  that  populaces  
could  be  controlled  and  monitored  to  prevent  infiltration  and  the  recruitment  of  
South  Vietnamese  peasants  into  the  Viet  Cong.98  The  idea  was  borne  from  British  
experiences  in  Malaya  and  the  Philippines.  The  strategic  hamlets  were  implemented  
at  the  behest  of  American  advisors  in  Vietnam.99  The  strategic  hamlet  program  was  
however  symbolic  of  other  policy  failures  in  Vietnam.  Many  peasants  were  forcibly  
displaced  off  their  land  and  into  encampments  created  to  ensure  government  control  
of  the  peasants  as  much  as  their  protection.  The  Diem  government  viewed  the  
program  in  this  way,  as  another  mechanism  to  establish  and  maintain  control  over  
the  South  Vietnamese  peasant  population.  The  program  continued  apace  from  its  
inception  in  1962  and  by  the  end  of  that  year  over  2800  hamlets  had  been  
constructed.100  Long—form  analysis  showed  that  despite  this  the  program  was  
undeniably  flawed  as  peasants  did  not  appreciate  being  taken  off  their  land,  and  the  
ability  of  infiltrators  to  access  peasants  was  not  effectively  impeded.101  If  anything,  
peasants  were  more  likely  to  join  the  Viet  Cong  as  a  means  to  return  to  their  land.   
 
In  analysing  the  failure  of  the  strategic  hamlet  program  Halberstam  and  Sheehan  
both  identify  that  the  American  response  was  symptomatic  of  the  past  and  future  
responses  to  policy  failure.102  There  was  complete  unwillingness  on  the  American  side  
to  accept  the  degree  of  failure  of  the  system,  best  demonstrated  by  Halberstam  in  
how,  when  the  subject  of  overstated  Vietnamese  figures  was  brought  up  by  
Lieutenant  Colonel  Fred  Ladd,  Harkins  “upbraided  him  for  challenging  the  word  of  a  
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Vietnamese  officer  …  Ladd  looked  at  him  or  a  long  time  and  said  simply  ‘I  thought  
we  were  talking  American  to  American.’”103  The  refusal  to  address  these  fabricated  
numbers  at  the  source  meant  that  these  numbers  would  be  conveyed  up  the  chain  
of  command,  and  thus  become  official,  perpetrating  the  myth  of  success.  In  
explaining  in  detail  the  failure  of  the  Strategic  Hamlet  Program,  Halberstam  and  
Sheehan  sought  to  bring  to  light  the  greater  symptom  of  misinformation  propagated  
by  the  American  and  Vietnamese  governments  and  how  the  Hamlet  Program  was  

















                                                          





The  Vietnam  War  influenced  the  rise  of  long-form  journalism  due  to  journalists’  in-
depth  exploration  of  facts  in  the  wider  context  of  the  war  that  was  not  found  in  
short-form  reporting.  In  examining  the  war  with  long-form,  journalists  look  in  greater  
detail  at  both  “the  inside  and  outside  of  an  event.”104Robin  Collingwood  defines  the  
inside  and  outside  of  events  in  The  Idea  of  History.  “By  the  outside  of  the  event  I  
mean  everything  belonging  to  it  which  can  be  described  in  terms  of  bodies  and  their  
movements  …  By  the  inside  of  the  event  I  mean  that  in  it  which  can  only  be  
described  in  terms  of  thought.”105  Collingwood  applies  this  idea  to  the  study  of  
history  in  that  “the  historian  is  never  concerned  with  either  of  these  to  the  exclusion  
of  the  other.”106  However,  it  is  also  applicable  to  the  examination  of  journalists’  long-
form  investigation  of  the  Vietnam  War.   
In  short-form  writing  journalists  are  primarily  concerned  with  the  outside  of  events.  
For  war  correspondents  in  particular,  whose  work  was  edited  before  it  appeared  in  
newspapers  the  inclusion  of  inside  analysis  of  events  could  be  difficult.  This  was  
especially  applicable  to  Halberstam,  whose  work  was  often  edited  at  the  foreign  desk  
of  NYT  to  eliminate  “the  dreaded  point  of  view  that  found  its  way  into  his  
articles.”107  By  writing  about  the  Vietnam  War  in  long-form,  journalists  could  examine  
with  more  freedom  both  the  outside  of  events  and  the  inside.  Journalists  writing  
long-form  serve  to  bridge  the  gap  between  journalists  writing  short-form  work,  
concerned  with  immediate  issues  of  the  day,  and  historians  who  deal  with  the  
distant  to  near  distant  past.  It  is  the  opinions  and  analyses  of  journalists  who  
experienced  and  lived  through  the  war,  while  at  the  same  time  researching  and  
covering  it,  that  allows  their  long-form  writing  to  explore  the  wider  context  of  the  
Vietnam  War.     
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Journalists  explored  key  areas  of  the  Vietnam  War  through  long-form  writing,  
researching  and  synthesising  information  into  a  critical  analysis.  Journalists  examined  
the  secrecy  and  policies  of  the  American  government  through  long-form  journalism  as  
a  way  to  show  the  immediate  and  long-term  effects  of  actions  across  the  long  
timeframe  of  the  war.  The  covering  up  and  withholding  of  information  about  the  
Diem  regime  meant  that  Kennedy  “told  aides  that  he  could  not  believe  a  word  that  
the  military  was  telling  him,  that  he  had  to  read  the  newspapers  to  find  out  what  
was  going  on.”108  By  examining  this  cover  up  in  long-form,  journalists  can  examine  
wider  aspects  of  the  inside  of  events  by  getting  details  about  the  thoughts,  
misgivings  and  certainties  of  those  who  governed  America.  Journalists  analysed  the  
American  policy  in  pre-communist  China  and  demonstrated  that  the  failure  of  
American  policy  in  China  only  exacerbated  issues  of  American  commitment  to  
stopping  the  spread  of  communism  in  South  East  Asia.  This  was  only  buoyed  by  the  
McCarthy  period  of  American  politics  which  ensured  that  the  lessons  of  China  would  
swiftly  be  forgotten.   
 
The  misinformation  engineered  within  Vietnam  for  consumption  by  the  American  
government  and  the  public  was  predicated  on  the  back  of  initial  military  failures  that  
were  tidied  up  and  misconstrued  by  the  military,  requiring  a  more  comprehensive  
analysis  than  short-form  journalism  could  provide.  By  examining  in  greater  detail  both  
the  initial  facts  and  the  chain  through  which  information  passed,  journalists  
demonstrated  the  deliberate  intention  to  mislead  the  government  and  public,  about  
the  course  of  the  war.  When  the  reality  of  the  situation  later  came  to  light,  the  
deployment  of  American  troops  to  Vietnam  in  a  combat  role  became  a  major  issue  
of  policy  for  the  American  government.  This  policy  focused  on  continuing  and  
propagating  the  military  strategy  of  attrition.  Journalists  demonstrated  through  their  
investigations  that  the  strategy  of  attrition  alone  was  insufficient  to  defeat  the  Viet  
Cong  and  North  Vietnamese,  and  that  to  truly  secure  South  Vietnam  as  an  
independent  nation  in  its  own  right,  a  broader  policy  of  political  and  social  reform  
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was  necessary.  Journalists  showed  how  the  results  of  the  war  generated  silence  
around  the  acknowledgement  of  Vietnam  veterans  and  the  experiences  that  they  had  
during  the  war.  The  American  defeat  in  the  war  meant  that  experiences  of  the  war  
were  often  untold.  Journalists’  exposure  of  Vietnam  veterans’  experiences  in  long-
form  writing  generated  greater  public  knowledge  and  awareness  about  veterans’  
issues  from  the  war. 
Journalists'  critique  of  the  lack  of  reform  and  focus  on  the  sole  objective  of  attrition  
highlighted  the  limited  scope  of  the  American  mission  to  Vietnam  and  the  failure  to  
adapt  strategy  or  admit  that  the  efforts  being  undertaken  were  unsuccessful.  
Journalists’  exploration  of  the  kill  ratio  and  strategic  hamlet  program,  supported  by  
General  Harkins  and  General  Westmoreland,  demonstrated  how  the  continued  
mismanagement  of  numbers  was  used  to  present  a  misleading  image  of  success  for  
the  war.  In  particular,  the  success  of  a  kill  ratio  was  used  to  demonstrate  the  
success  of  the  policy  of  attrition.  Journalists  showed  that  the  lack  of  a  broader  
strategy  limited  American  success  in  Vietnam  and  consigned  America  to  defeat  as  in  
the  words  of  Joseph  Anderson,  “Long  before  Saigon  fell,  it  was  clear  to  me  the  
United  States  was  not  willing  to  win  the  war,  So  the  only  alternative  is  to  lose  the  
war.”109   
Long-form  journalism  was  the  key  component  of  criticism  and  analysis  used  by  
journalists  who  covered  the  Vietnam  War.  By  writing  long-form  instead  of  traditional  
newspaper  or  magazine  articles,  journalists  were  among  the  first  to  provide  a  
detailed  examination  of  the  Vietnam  War,  not  just  presenting  facts  and  news  about  
the  war  itself  but  explaining,  criticising  and  questioning  the  war.  Long-form  provided  
journalists  with  a  method  whereby  extensive  critique  of  the  war  could  be  conducted. 
The  deceitful  practices,  failed  policies  and  strategies  witnessed  by  journalists  during  
the  Vietnam  War  spurred  them  to  use  long-form  journalism  to  express  and  examine  
what  they  saw.  They  sought  to  present  the  reality  of  the  war  in  a  way  that  they  
had  been  unable  to  do  through  the  pages  of  a  newspaper.  Other  wars  had  
presented  similar  issues  for  journalists  to  study,  but  never  before  had  journalism  
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experienced  what  it  did  during  the  Vietnam  War.  War  correspondents  were  reporting  
on  America’s  slow  fall  into  ever  greater  and  more  deadly  failure,  helped  on  by  a  
degree  of  secrecy  and  misinformation  that  permeated  almost  every  level  of  military  
command  and  government  position  and  a  comprehensive  failure  of  policy  and  
strategy  due  to  inflexibility  and  a  refusal  to  address  the  failures  of  the  past.  This  
culminated  in  the  ignominious  American  departure  from  South  Vietnam  that  was  
investigated  and  examined  by  journalists  who  for  years  had  watched  this  graceless  
descent  into  disaster.  The  long,  slow  failure  of  the  Vietnam  War  made  long-form  
journalism,  with  its  depth,  stylistic  freedom  and  independence,  the  preferred  medium  
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